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POLAR OPPOSITES: ASSESSING THE 
STATE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN  
THE WORLD’S POLAR REGIONS 
MARK P. NEVITT* 
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL** 
Abstract: Climate change is fundamentally transforming both the Arctic and 
Antarctic polar regions. Yet these regions differ dramatically in their governing 
legal regimes. For the past sixty years the Antarctic Treaty System, a traditional 
“hard law” international law treaty system, effectively de-militarized the Antarc-
tic region and halted competing sovereignty claims. In contrast, the Arctic region 
lacks a unifying Arctic treaty and is governed by the newer “soft law” global en-
vironmental law model embodied in the Arctic Council’s collaborative work. 
Now climate change is challenging this model. It is transforming the geography 
of both polar regions, breaking away massive ice sheets in Antarctica, melting 
the polar ice cap in the Arctic, opening maritime trade routes, and renewing the 
possibility for natural resource extraction. Will the Arctic experience a peaceful 
future similar to its sister polar region, or will it emerge as a polar “wild west” 
with increasing geopolitical tension between the Arctic states? Will a new polar 
Cold War emerge between Russia and the other four North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization Arctic coastal nations? This Article addresses these questions—and 
others—while making three new contributions to legal scholarship. First, we 
closely examine the different legal models in both the Arctic and Antarctica, dis-
cerning what lessons the ATS—one of the most successful international agree-
ments in history—can be applied to the Arctic. Second, we analyze the unique 
significance played by global environmental law in the context of the polar re-
gions, best embodied by the collaborative work of the Arctic Council. Third, in 
light of the uncertainty posed by climate change and the potential for rising geo-
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political tensions, we provide a new framework to analyze future Arctic govern-
ance to include the five key factors that will determine the Arctic’s future. 
INTRODUCTION 
The planet’s polar regions are the most environmentally sensitive areas on 
earth with the harshest climatic conditions. Yet they differ dramatically in their 
topography as well as their governing legal regimes. Although the Arctic 
Ocean lies at the heart of the Arctic polar region, the continent of Antarctica—
the coldest, driest, and windiest landmass on earth—dominates the Antarctic 
polar region. Free from any military activities and competing sovereignty 
claims, Antarctica has been a place of peace and stability for more than a half 
century. This is largely due to the remarkable international environmental law 
success of the Antarctic Treaty System (“ATS”), a series of forward-looking 
international agreements that de-militarized Antarctica and halted competing 
sovereignty claims.1 The ATS “hard law” regime prohibits access to Antarcti-
ca’s vast potential mineral resources, effectively establishing a “land without a 
sovereign” and worldwide nature reserve. In contrast, the Arctic region lacks a 
comprehensive and Arctic-specific treaty binding on all Arctic stakeholders 
and is largely governed by the work of the Arctic Council and a loose hodge-
podge of “soft law” agreements. 
But climate change is challenging this construct. It is transforming the po-
lar regions in fundamental ways, calling into question the existing Arctic soft 
law model. Indeed, the Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change states 
that climate change’s most immediate and intense effects are already appearing 
in the polar regions, areas already warming at twice the rate of the rest of the 
planet.2 In July 2017, an ice sheet the size of Delaware broke away from the 
continent of Antarctica, potentially foreshadowing the beginning of a massive 
polar ice sheet fragmentation with an unknown impact on global sea level 
rise.3 Indeed, the Arctic polar ice caps are melting at the fastest rate in recorded 
history, re-making trade routes, removing the ice cap “ceiling,” and opening 
the possibility for massive oil and gas extraction.4 Highlighting this remarka-
                                                                                                                           
 1 Melissa A. Verhaag, Note, It Is Not Too Late: The Need for a Comprehensive International 
Treaty to Protect the Arctic Environment, 15 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 555, 571 (2003) (describing 
the Antarctica Treaty as “[a]rguably the most successful international treaty in existence”). 
 2 Don Walsh, The Arctic Ocean—Hot Times in a Cold Place,  PROCEEDINGS MAG., July 2017,  at 
91,  91 (stating that the Arctic is warming twice as fast as the rest of the planet and detailing the rate of 
ice loss and decrease in ice thickness).  
 3 Sean Greene, Antarctica Shed a Block of Ice the Size of Delaware, but Scientists Think the Real 
Disaster Could Be Decades Away, L.A. TIMES (July 13, 2017, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/
science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-larson-ice-sheet-20170713-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/7KN3-
Z9KQ]. 
 4 Joseph F.C. DiMento, Environmental Governance of the Arctic: Law, Effect, Now Implementa-
tion, 6 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 23, 25–26 (2016). 
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ble change, a cruise ship with 900 passengers recently navigated the Northwest 
Passage in the Arctic—the largest such journey of a vessel that size in recorded 
human history.5 
Natural resources abound in the Arctic, home to an estimated one-fifth of 
the world’s oil and gas resources. Most reside offshore and lie untapped.6 Alt-
hough lower worldwide oil prices have temporarily halted a massive Arctic oil 
rush, private industry remains interested in the Arctic as a future source of val-
uable oil, gas, and mineral resources.7 In light of the diverse impacts of climate 
change, the work of the consensus-based Arctic Council, an intergovernmental 
forum for the eight Arctic states, has taken on increased importance. The pre-
cise legal contours of which nation has the unadulterated rights to access these 
resources, however, remain unclear. 
Long-term uncertainty looms in the Arctic as global warming rapidly 
shrinks the Arctic ice pack and opens navigational waterways.8 We ultimately 
foresee an increased competition for oil and mineral exploitation, competing 
continental shelf claims, and greater potential for environmental damage in 
light of increased shipping traffic in the Arctic.9 Additional questions arise: 
Will the future Arctic resemble a new global “wild west” as nations compete 
and confront one another for its untapped resources? Or will the Arctic have a 
more peaceful and stable future mirroring the stability enjoyed by Antarctica 
                                                                                                                           
 5 Rachel Waldholz, In Warmer Climate, a Luxury Cruise Sets Sail Through Northwest Passage, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 27, 2016, 6:38 AM), https://www.npr.org/2016/08/27/491337521/in-warmer-
climate-a-luxury-cruise-sets-sail-through-northwest-passage [https://perma.cc/XK4W-HEKL]. 
 6 See DiMento, supra note 4, at 25. 
 7 See Envtl. Def. Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (stating that Antarctica is a 
“continent without a sovereign”). Drilling for oil in the Arctic has been mitigated, somewhat, by the 
lower cost of oil. See Emily Atkin, Shell Can Now Begin Drilling in the Arctic, THINK PROGRESS (July 
23, 2015, 2:14 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/shell-can-now-begin-drilling-in-the-arctic-66a4508d31eb/ 
[https://perma.cc/KPT2-CX4E ] (reporting on the Obama Administration’s granting of Shell to begin 
exploratory drilling in the Chukchi Sea, about 140 miles from Alaska’s northwest shoreline); Steven 
Lee Myers & Clifford Krauss, Melting Ice Isn’t Opening Arctic to Oil Bonanza, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/08/world/europe/melting-ice-isnt-opening-arctic-to-oil-
bonanza.html?mcubz=0 [https://perma.cc/N4DZ-S5X4 ] (reporting that, despite rapidly melting ice, it 
is still difficult for countries to extract oil and natural gas from the Arctic Circle). 
 8 By accelerating the melting of the polar ice cap and Antarctic ice shelves, climate change is 
fundamentally changing the geography of both polar regions. The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 
stated that “the most rapid and severe climate change on earth” is occurring in the Arctic. ARCTIC 
CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT, IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC 10 (2004). Climate change is dra-
matically impacting the two polar regions. See generally id. 
 9 Some commentators have noted that the lack of a clear and binding governing Arctic legal regime 
may cause the Arctic to “erupt in an armed mad dash for its resources . . . .” See generally LAURENCE C. 
SMITH, THE NEW NORTH: THE WORLD IN 2050 (2011) (discussing the overlapping effects of climate 
change, population growth, and globalization on our planet’s future); Scott G. Borgerson, Arctic Melt-
down: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mar./Apr. 
2008), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/arctic-antarctic/2008-03-02/arctic-meltdown [https://
perma.cc/9CAD-8M2X] (discussing the political and economic implications of rapid global warming); 
Verhaag, supra note 1 (discussing the environmental vulnerability of the Arctic). 
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for the past sixty years? Is the “soft law” and consensus-based Arctic govern-
ance model sufficient to address this historic geopolitical and environmental 
shift or, ultimately, will a “hard law” solution such as a comprehensive and 
binding Arctic Treaty be required to mitigate geopolitical tensions and compet-
ing sovereignty interests?10 This Article examines these questions, and others, 
by deciphering what lessons—if any—Antarctica can teach the Arctic. It also 
provides a new framework, highlighting the five key factors—discussed be-
low—that will have an increasingly important impact on the future of Arctic 
governance. We assert that although the ATS system cannot be replicated in the 
Arctic, important lessons can be drawn from the ATS success, which should 
serve as an inspiration and polar muse for future Arctic governance matters. 
First and foremost, the Arctic’s changing geography reinforces the need 
for the United States to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (“UNCLOS”).11 This will ensure a seat at the table for the United States in 
continental shelf deliberations—critical to finalize competing continental shelf 
claims among the Arctic nations. Second, we assert that global environmental 
law will continue to play an outsized role in both polar regions. As calls for 
negotiating an over-arching Arctic Treaty have been met with skepticism, Arc-
tic stakeholders have taken several proactive and incremental steps via the Arc-
tic Council to improve environmental protection. Indeed, these initiatives are 
consistent with global environmental law’s emphasis on private and public 
partnerships that emerge organically from the “bottom-up.” Third, we assert 
that the Arctic region’s future hinges on five key factors: (1) UNCLOS’s long-
term ability to solve competing continental shelf claims; (2) long-term Russian 
military ambitions in the Arctic; (3) the true pace of climate change in the po-
lar regions; (4) the future cost of extracting oil and minerals from the Arctic; 
and (5) potentially divergent geopolitical interests between Arctic coastal 
states, non-coastal states and non-Arctic states. As of this writing, lower global 
oil prices have temporarily stalled the race to exploit Arctic resources—but this 
may not be a permanent state of affairs. As such, this is the opportune time to 
strengthen environmental protection and governance in the Arctic. 
Part I provides an overview of the Arctic region, addressing its geography 
and environment as well as providing an overview of its soft law system, ex-
                                                                                                                           
 10 See Sarah E. Light, The Military-Environmental Complex, 52 B.C. L. REV. 879, 919 (2014) 
(describing the U.S. Department of Defense recognizing the Arctic as a “potential new area[] of con-
flict” upon receiving news that Russian naval vessels were “patrolling newly opened shipping lanes in 
the Arctic Ocean”). See generally Jean Galbraith & David Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 
99 CORNELL L. REV. 735 (2014) (examining the effectiveness of using soft law as foreign relations 
law before concluding that soft law should be recognized as a viable way for executive agencies to 
engage in foreign relations). 
 11 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [herein-
after UNCLOS]. 
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emplified by the increasingly important work of the Arctic Council.12 Part II 
provides an overview of Antarctica, including its geography, environment, and 
a summary of the ATS.13 After analyzing and comparing the legal regimes 
governing the two polar regions, Part III looks to the role of global environ-
mental law in the Arctic while offering initial recommendations to improve 
environmental protection and to defuse future conflicts in the polar regions.14 
Part IV surveys the five critical factors that will have the greatest impact on 
future Arctic governance, and offers initial recommendations to neutralize any 
potential rising tensions.15 
I. THE ARCTIC REGION: GROWING IN IMPORTANCE BUT LACKING A 
COMPREHENSIVE & BINDING LEGAL REGIME 
A. The Arctic Region: In Need of a Well-Established and  
Understood Definition 
The Arctic region encompasses a diverse maritime-centric area bordering 
several nations that is home to almost four million people. The terms “Arctic” 
and “Arctic region,” however, lack a universally accepted definition among 
lawyers and scientists.16 Under the Arctic’s most commonly used definition, it 
encompasses all “the land and sea area north of the Arctic Circle”—defined as 
latitude 66.34° North.17 But another Arctic definition includes all the land and 
sea area where the average temperature is below ten degrees Celsius in July 
(the warmest month of the year there).18 This definition creates an irregularly 
shaped circle that excludes Finland and Sweden.19 An Arctic Council working 
group, the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (“AMAP”), has 
adopted yet another definition of the Arctic region to encompass “the terrestrial 
and marine areas north of the Arctic Circle (66°32’ N), and north of 62°N in 
Asia and 60°N in North America, modified to include the marine areas of the 
Aleutian chain, Hudson Bay, and parts of the North Atlantic . . . .”20 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See infra notes 16–118 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 119–185 and accompanying text. 
 14See infra notes 186–232and accompanying text. It is beyond the scope of the Article to provide 
an in-depth analysis of all the difficulties of environmental cleanup in the Arctic. But the underlying 
harsh conditions and distance from sophisticated cleanup resources make environmental pollution 
cleanup and remediation particularly difficult. See Verhaag, supra note 1, at 559–60 (listing six rea-
sons why the Arctic’s environmental concerns are “more acute than in most other areas of the globe”). 
 15 See infra notes 233–279 and accompanying text. 
 16 RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41153, CHANGES IN THE ARCTIC: BACK-
GROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1–2 (2014). 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at 4. 
 19 See infra note 27 and accompanying figure. 
 20 Id. at 5. 
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Within U.S. law, “Arctic” is defined in the 1984 Arctic Research and Pol-
icy Act, as incorporating a large area below the Arctic Circle to include the 
Aleutian Island chain.21 It states: 
As used in this title, the term “Arctic” means all U.S. and foreign ter-
ritory north of the Arctic Circle and all U.S. territory north and west 
of the boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwin 
Rivers; all contiguous areas, including the Arctic Ocean and the Beau-
fort, Bering and Chuckhi Seas, and the Aleutian island chains.22 
Eight nations—Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), Finland, Iceland, 
Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States (via Alaska) have boundaries 
within the Arctic Circle.23 These eight nations, often called the “Arctic na-
tions,” are longstanding members of the Arctic Council.24 Within these eight 
Arctic nations, five Arctic coastal states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, 
and the United States) have continental shelves in the Arctic, however it is de-
fined.25 As discussed below, determining the extent of a nation’s continental 
shelf is critically important for oil, gas, and mineral extraction rights. Unlike 
Antarctica, which has no permanent population, indigenous people reside in 
seven of the eight Arctic nations. Indigenous peoples have inhabited the Arctic 
for thousands of years—and their communities are increasingly vulnerable to 
climate change’s impacts.26 
 The Arctic Ocean—illustrated in Figure 1 of the Appendix27—is the 
world’s smallest ocean, yet it dominates the Arctic region, forming an increas-
ingly vital maritime connection between the northern Atlantic and northern 
Pacific Ocean. Its circular basin is nearly 150% larger than the United States.28 
And the Arctic Ocean’s “deep central basin . . . is almost completely surround-
ed by the coastal States’ continental shelves”—similar to five orange wedges 
merging at the North Pole.29 No other place on earth witnesses such a geopolit-
                                                                                                                           
 21 Id. at 2. 
 2215 U.S.C. § 4111 (2012). The Arctic Research and Policy Act was passed to provide a compre-
hensive policy on research needs in the Arctic, and “designated the National Science Foundation . . . 
as the lead federal agency for implementing Arctic research policy . . . .” O’ROURKE, supra note 16, at 
5. 
 23 O’ROURKE, supra note 16, at 1–2. Of note, no accepted definition of the Arctic excludes the 
lower two-thirds of Alaska or the Bering Sea and Bering Strait. Id. 
 24 Id. at 2. 
 25 Id.  
 26 Id. at 36–41. 
 27 PAT: THE FREE, OPEN SOURCE, PORTABLE ATLAS, https://ian.macky.net/pat/map/arct/arctblu2.
gif [https://perma.cc/K8NL-22BG]. 
 28 Christopher C. Joyner, The Legal Regime for the Arctic Ocean, 18 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 
195, 201 (2009). 
 29 See Brent Carpenter, Comment, Warm Is the New Cold: Global Warming, Oil, UNCLOS Arti-
cle 76, and How an Arctic Treaty Might Stop a New Cold War, 39 ENVTL. L. 215, 231 & n.134 (2009) 
(citing Arthur Grantz, Treatment of Ridges and Borderlands Under Article 76 of the United Nations 
1662 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1655 
ical convergence. The major seaports are Prudhoe Bay in the United States, 
Churchill in Canada, and Murmansk in Russia.30 The Chukchi Sea provides 
access to the northern Pacific Ocean and is of major strategic interest to Russia 
and the United States.31 
The Arctic is warming twice as fast as the rest of the planet, altering the 
Arctic’s unique geophysical character at a rapidly accelerating rate.32 Consider 
climate change’s impact on the Arctic’s perennial drifting polar ice pack. The 
size of the Arctic icepack has historically fluctuated, shrinking in the summer 
but freezing over during the winter months.33 It averages between two and 
three meters of thickness and covers the Arctic throughout much of the year.34 
But this, too, is starting to change as the icepack fluctuations have become 
                                                                                                                           
Convention on Law of the Sea: The Example of the Arctic Ocean, in LEGAL AND SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS 
OF CONTINENTAL SHELF LIMITS 201, 203 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2004)). 
 30 Unlike Russia, the United States currently does not have a major military facility or airfield 
bordering the Arctic Ocean, nor are there immediate plans to build one. See David Vine, Where in the 
World Is the U.S. Military?, POLITICO (July/Aug. 2015), www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/
06/us-military-bases-around-the-world-119321 [https://perma.cc/HT45-V8SC] (providing a map of 
U.S. military bases outside of the U.S.). 
 31 The World Factbook: Arctic Ocean, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (2018) [hereinafter CIA: 
Arctic Ocean], https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/xq.html [https://
perma.cc/SD9Y-KZPP]. 
 32 Walsh, supra note 2, at 91. Consistent with broader principles of international environmental 
law, the Arctic Council members have “common but differentiated [i.e. greater] responsibilities” to 
the world environment. See U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, The Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development, Principle 7, U.N. Doc A/CONF.151/26 (June 3–14, 1992) (provid-
ing that countries must work to reverse environmental degradation based upon their individual contri-
butions to such degradation). 
 33 CIA: Arctic Ocean, supra note 31. The CIA further states: 
Canada and the United States dispute how to divide the Beaufort Sea and the status of 
the Northwest Passage but continue to work cooperatively to survey the Arctic conti-
nental shelf; Denmark (Greenland) and Norway have made submissions to the Com-
mission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) and Russia is collecting addi-
tional data to augment its 2001 CLCS submission; record summer melting of sea ice in 
the Arctic has renewed interest in maritime shipping lanes and sea floor exploration; 
Norway and Russia signed a comprehensive maritime boundary agreement in 2010. 
Id. 
 34 Environment: Trends, NAT’L SNOW & ICE DATA CTR. (2018), http://nsidc.org/cryosphere/
seaice/environment/trends.html [https://perma.cc/99RB-XWDJ]. In addition, UNCLOS has a provi-
sion for “ice-covered areas.” It states: 
Coastal states have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations 
for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered 
areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic 
conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstruc-
tions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could 
cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and 
regulations shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence. 
UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 234. 
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more dramatic. Climate change is altering the ice pack’s size: its surface size 
has decreased by an average three percent every ten years, and its thickness 
has decreased by at least sixty-five percent over the last four decades.35  
The summer ice pack has receded even more in recent years, opening up 
shipping lines and navigational waterways for the first time in human history. 
Mariners since the fifteenth century have been fascinated by the Arctic region’s 
geography with an eye toward discovering shorter trade routes between Europe 
and Asia. Two seasonal waterways—the Northwest Passage through Canada 
and the somewhat lesser known but increasingly important Northern Sea route 
alongside Russia—can be found in the Arctic. The Northwest Passage contains 
several possible routes, all running through the Canadian Arctic Islands and 
linking trade from northeast Asia through North America to the northern Atlan-
tic.36 The Northern Sea Route hugs the Russian coastline. This route is of par-
ticular importance for Russia as it provides the shortest maritime link between 
the eastern and western part of the country, offering a potential shortcut to Eu-
rope and the Atlantic.37 
The fifteenth century dream is now becoming a twenty-first century reali-
ty. For the first time in history, the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route 
are becoming increasingly viable and witnessing a significant uptick in traffic. 
Indeed, a 900-passenger cruise ship successfully made the Northwest Passage 
journey through the Arctic Ocean in the summer of 2016—the first time that a 
vessel of that size made the journey in recorded history.38 
B. The Arctic Council: A Source of Cooperation and Stability for the 
Region with an Evolving and Important Role in Arctic Governance 
The Arctic Council, the confederation of the eight Arctic nations, plays a 
critically important role in Arctic governance. The Arctic Council’s genesis 
began modestly, but has demonstrated an ability to evolve and expand its role 
over time to meet emergent Arctic challenges. Arctic governance can be traced 
to the end of the Cold War when former Soviet Secretary General Mikhail 
Gorbachev called upon all of the Arctic nations to develop a more formalized 
international Arctic governance structure.39 Two years following Gorbachev’s 
                                                                                                                           
 35 Walsh, supra note 32, at 91. 
 36 O’ROURKE, supra note 16, at 19. In 2013, the first bulk carrier (carrying coal) successfully 
sailed from western Canada to Finland via the Northwest Passage. Id. 
 37 CIA: Arctic Ocean, supra note 31. 
 38 Marc Thiessen, Thanks to Melting Ice, Cruise Ship Travels Northwest Passage, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (Sept. 9, 2016, 9:21 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/news/articles/2016-09-
09/giant-cruise-ship-makes-historic-voyage-in-melting-arctic [https://perma.cc/T6RL-DJSG]. 
 39 Heather Exner-Pirot, How Gorbachev Shaped Future Arctic Policy 25 Years Ago, ANCHORAGE 
DAILY NEWS (Oct. 1, 2012), https://www.adn.com/arctic/article/how-gorbachev-shaped-future-arctic-
policy-25-years-ago/2012/10/01/ [https://perma.cc/A7HQ-ELRA]. 
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call to action, the Exxon Valdez oil spill tragedy devastated the near Arctic re-
gion off the Alaskan coast. This heightened global awareness of the Arctic re-
gion’s fragile environment, exposing the world’s inability to respond to envi-
ronmental disasters in the region. Arctic nations followed through on Gorba-
chev’s earlier proposal in adopting the 1991 Rovaniemi Declaration in 
Rovaniemi, Finland.40 This established the AMAP to monitor the levels of, and 
assess the effects of, pollutants in the Arctic environment.41 It also established 
the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (“AEPS”)—a concrete effort to 
proactively identify and solve environmental problems in the Arctic.42 
Although short-lived, the AEPS laid the groundwork for future Arctic col-
laboration, culminating in the 1996 signing of the Ottawa Declaration.43 This 
formally established the Arctic Council as a “high level forum” for “promoting 
cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the Arctic states . . . .”44 The 
AEPS’s legacy and environmental focus can be seen in the Arctic Council’s 
construct and focus.45 Indeed, all eight AEPS signatories signed the Ottawa 
Declaration and many of the AEPS working groups established by the AEPS 
are incorporated within the Arctic Council.46 Within the Arctic Council, five of 
the Arctic coastal states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United 
States) have a continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean that offers the potential to 
harvest oil, natural gas, and minerals pursuant to maritime boundaries and pro-
cedures set forth in UNCLOS.47 The three non-coastal states (Finland, Iceland, 
and Sweden) lack an Arctic continental shelf and are effectively precluded 
from submitting continental shelf claims.48 
The organizational setup of the Arctic Council is somewhat unique: it on-
ly meets on a biennial basis and there is no permanent staff or dedicated fund-
                                                                                                                           
 40 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy: Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic Envi-
ronment, June 14, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1624 [hereinafter Rovaniemi Declaration]. 
 41 Id. ¶ 6.1. 
 42 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, June 14, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1627. 
 43 Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, Sept. 19, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1387 [herein-
after Ottawa Declaration]. 
 44 Id. art. 1(a). 
 45 See Rovaniemi Declaration, supra note 40, preface (stating that signatory countries commit to 
implementing AEPS). 
 46 Ottawa Declaration, supra note 43, art. 1(a) n.1. The working group setup is also somewhat 
unusual as each working group operates with its own secretariat, focus, and from a different locale. Id. 
art. 6. 
 47 O’ROURKE, supra note 16, at 2, 11–13; see David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 
B.C. L. REV. 139, 148–49, 171(2009) (asserting that UNCLOS “sharply defines the ocean spaces 
within which different legal regimes operate”). 
 48 The U.S. Senate, however, has not ratified UNCLOS and there is not a clear legal basis for the 
United States to submit a Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (“CLCS”) claim pursu-
ant to UNCLOS. Id. at 17. The three non-coastal Arctic states were not invited to participate in the 
Ilulissat Declaration meeting, presumably because they lacked the ability to make hydrocarbon claims. 
Id. 
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ing source, and the responsibility for hosting these meetings is rotated sequen-
tially among the eight member States.49 All decisions of the Arctic Council are 
by consensus of the members, made after full consultation.50 Unlike the ATS, 
discussed in Part II, the Arctic Council’s permanent voting members only in-
clude nations resident to the Arctic.51 Of increasing importance to address geo-
political tensions, the Arctic Council also lacks a mandate to tackle all Arctic 
issues. For example, it lacks the mandate to address issues of sovereignty, nat-
ural resource exploitation, and military activities.52 Though the Arctic Council 
has shown an ability to evolve to meet emerging issues, a significant void nev-
ertheless persists in its ability to comprehensively address all Arctic issues as 
they arise.53 
But the Arctic Council’s somewhat unconventional governance structure 
does provide certain advantages. First, it provides a home and voice for both 
non-governmental organizations and indigenous people who have inhabited the 
Arctic for thousands of years. Indeed, the Ottawa Declaration expressly desig-
nates certain indigenous tribes as permanent participants (non-voting) within 
the Arctic Council.54 And permanent observer status has recently been granted 
to non-Arctic nations, including China.55 Second, the Arctic Council serves as 
a collaborative forum to address Arctic issues as they arise. In doing so, it has 
demonstrated the capacity to evolve and expand over time. Serving akin to an 
“Arctic United Nations,” it can operate in an incremental and cooperative fash-
ion consistent with broader principles of global environmental law discussed in 
Part III. 
As an outgrowth of the AEPS, the Arctic Council focuses primarily on 
environmental matters. But this, too, has started to expand as two recent Arctic 
Council-engineered agreements created binding legal obligations for the Arctic 
signatories.56 For example, in May 2011 the Arctic Council adopted the Arctic 
                                                                                                                           
 49 Ottawa Declaration, supra note 43, art. 5. 
 50 Id. art. 7. 
 51 Id. art. 2. 
 52 “The Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security.” Id. art. 1(a) n.1. 
 53 See id. (acting as an example of a major Arctic issue that the Arctic Council is unequipped to 
fully resolve). 
 54 Id. art. 2. The permanent participants consist of the Aleut International Association, the Arctic 
Athabaskan Council, the Gwich’in Council International, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Russian 
Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, and the Saami Council. Permanent Participants, ARC-
TIC COUNCIL (July 6, 2015), http://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants 
[https://perma.cc/56YY-H9UZ]. Permanent observer status was recently granted to six countries: China, 
India, Italy, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea. O’ROURKE, supra note 16, at 5. 
 55 O’ROURKE, supra note 16, at 53. 
 56 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, 
May 12, 2011, T.I.A.S. No. 13-119 [hereinafter Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement]. The need for a 
stronger Arctic Council was reaffirmed in 2015 through the signing of the Iqaluit Declaration that 
“establish[ed] a Task Force to assess future needs for a regional seas program for . . . increased coop-
eration in Arctic marine areas,” and “work towards a legally-binding agreement on scientific coopera-
1666 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1655 
Search and Rescue Agreement, which set up a framework for the Arctic states 
to assist lost mariners.57 The Arctic nations later followed up with an agree-
ment entitled Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Re-
sponse, and developed guidance on oil spill response and marine pollution re-
sponse in the Arctic.58 In addition, the five Arctic coastal states have also taken 
steps to regulate trawling in Arctic waters newly free of ice, signing an agree-
ment to regulate fishery trawling in the “doughnut hole” area of the Arctic 
Ocean that is encircled by exclusive economic zones of the Arctic coastal 
countries.59 In doing so, the Arctic nations emphasized the importance of tak-
ing a precautionary approach to Arctic waters as they become more accessi-
ble.60 
In 2017, Finland assumed the Council’s chairmanship, succeeding the 
United States, who chaired the Arctic Council from 2015–2017.61 When the 
United States chaired the Council, Secretary of State John Kerry re-
emphasized the threat of climate change to the Arctic and noted that the Coun-
cil’s member states and observers account for sixty percent of global green-
house gas emissions. In a joint statement with Canada discussing Arctic policy, 
                                                                                                                           
tion . . . .” Arctic Council, Iqaluit Declaration ¶¶ 43–44, Apr. 24, 2015, https://oaarchive.arctic-
council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/662/EDOCS-3431-v1-ACMMCA09_Iqaluit_2015_Iqaluit_
Declaration_original_scanned_signed_version.PDF?sequence=7&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/
2J5Z-67TJ]. Furthermore, Arctic Council agreements do not run into domestic roadblocks to imple-
mentation. The trend in recent years is for the United States to enter into sole executive agreements, 
which are widely accepted to have the same legal import as treaties. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 
315 U.S. 203, 223 (1942) (noting that “international compacts and agreements” have “similar dignity” 
to Article II treaties). At least one commentator has recommended that the United States accede to 
UNCLOS via a congressional-executive agreement, bypassing the two-thirds Senate advice and con-
sent requirement for treaties. See generally Andrew King, Thawing a Frozen Treaty: Protecting Unit-
ed States Interests in the Arctic with a Congressional-Executive Agreement on the Law of the Sea, 34 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 329 (2007). 
 57 Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement, supra note 56. 
 58 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic, 
May 15, 2013, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/529/EDOCS-2068-v1-
ACMMSE08_KIRUNA_2013_agreement_on_oil_pollution_preparedness_and_response_signed
Appendices_Original_130510.PDF?sequence=6&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/Z7TZ-MRBP] [here-
inafter Oil Pollution and Response Agreement]. Though not military agreements per se, the two 
agreements appear to go beyond the strict environmental mandate. The Arctic Search and Rescue 
Agreement may include military assets and the Oil Pollution and Response agreement addresses mat-
ters of environmental security. Id. art. 1 (providing that the agreement’s objective is to bolster the 
Arctic Council members’ “cooperation, coordination, and mutual assistance” in preparing for and 
responding to oil pollution); Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement, supra note 56, at app. II (listing 
Arctic Council nations’ coast guards and national defense agencies as search and rescue agencies). 
 59 Andrew E. Kramer, Russia and U.S. Find Common Cause in Arctic Pact, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/20/world/russia-and-us-find-common-cause-in-arctic-
pact.html?mcubz=3 [https://perma.cc/4QBA-PKTJ]. 
 60 Kramer, supra note 59. 
 61 Exploring Common Solutions: Finland’s Chairmanship 2017–2019, ARCTIC COUNCIL, 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/fin-chairmanship [https://perma.
cc/P6FA-GAQC]. 
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the United States advanced a “shared Arctic leadership model” which outlined 
four objectives: (1) “[c]onserving Arctic biodiversity through science-based 
decision making”; (2) “[i]ncorporating Indigenous science and traditional 
knowledge into decision-making”; (3) “[b]uilding a sustainable Arctic com-
munity” (with special attention to low impact shipping corridors, fisheries reg-
ulation and a science based approach to oil and gas); and (4) “[s]upporting 
strong Arctic communities.”62 The Obama administration suggested similar 
goals in a joint statement released with the Nordic States, but focused more on 
maintaining efforts that are already in place as opposed to redefining the ap-
proach.63 
C. The United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea  
(“UNCLOS”) and Future Arctic Governance 
UNCLOS, the world’s “Constitution of the Seas,” provides the legal ar-
chitecture for world maritime governance.64 Its jurisdictional provisions and 
procedures are of increasing importance to the Arctic as the “only place on the 
planet where the borders of five countries . . . come together . . . ‘the way sec-
tions of an orange meet at the stem.’”65 The Arctic nations have successfully 
cooperated in attempting to resolve the overlapping Exclusive Economic Zone 
(“EEZ”) and continental shelf claims. The EEZ pertains to economic rights on 
the surface and above the seabed whereas the continental shelf is below the 
                                                                                                                           
 62 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House, U.S.-Canada Joint Statement on Cli-
mate, Energy, and Arctic Leadership (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2016/03/10/us-canada-joint-statement-climate-energy-and-arctic-leadership [https://perma.cc/
V3DK-5LZ4]. 
 63 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House, U.S.-Nordic Leaders’ Joint Statement, 
(May 13, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/05/13/us-nordic-leaders-
summit-joint-statement [https://perma.cc/Q96P-6GWG]. 
 64 See generally UNCLOS, supra note 11 (providing a comprehensive international legal frame-
work for the use of the world’s oceans). 
 65 King, supra note 56, at 331. The United States’ current position on sovereignty matters in the 
Arctic is expressed in a U.S. Navy publication, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval 
Operations, reaffirming fundamental freedom of navigation principles within the Arctic without spe-
cifically acknowledging competing claims over natural resource exploitation in the Arctic. It states: 
The United States considers that the waters, ice pack, and airspace of the Arctic region be-
yond the lawfully claimed territorial seas of littoral nations have international status and 
are open to navigation by the ships and aircraft of all nations. Although several nations 
have, at times, attempted to claim sovereignty over the Arctic on the basis of discovery, 
historic use, contiguity (proximity), or the so-called “sector” theory, those claims are not 
recognized in international law. Accordingly, all ships and aircraft enjoy the freedoms of 
high seas navigation and overflight on, over, and under the waters and ice pack of the Arc-
tic region beyond the lawfully claimed territorial seas of littoral states. 
U.S. NAVY ET AL., THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS ¶ 2.6.5.1, 
NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12/COMDTPUB P5800.7A (July ed. 2007) [hereinafter COMMANDER’S 
HANDBOOK]. 
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surface and on the seabed and soil itself (i.e., where the oil and gas reside).66 
The relatively small size of the Arctic Ocean and its unique North Pole con-
vergence creates challenges when determining the scope and breadth of each 
nation’s continental shelf. In fact, approximately half of the Arctic’s ocean 
floor is comprised of continental shelf, the largest percentage of any one of the 
world’s oceans.67 
1. UNCLOS: A Promising but Ultimately Imperfect Mechanism to Resolve 
Competing Arctic Sovereignty Issues 
UNCLOS establishes a comprehensive maritime jurisdiction regime over 
the territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ, high seas, continental shelf, and an 
area set aside for the common heritage of mankind. It fully applies to the Arc-
tic Ocean and its nearby waters. Most importantly for future Arctic govern-
ance, it puts in place a process for nations to resolve their respective continen-
tal shelf claims.68 
UNCLOS’s first maritime jurisdiction, the territorial sea, extends the sov-
ereignty of the coastal state to twelve nautical miles from the coastal base-
line.69 Within the territorial sea, the coastal state has, in effect, complete sover-
eignty over the surface and seabed to include all the living and nonliving re-
sources.70 The contiguous zone is the second maritime zone beyond the territo-
rial sea. Extending twelve nautical miles from the territorial sea, it extends 
seaward from the coastal baseline up to twenty-four nautical miles where the 
coastal nation exercises special authority over fiscal, immigration, customs, 
and sanitary matters.71 Within the contiguous zone, ships and aircraft enjoy 
high seas freedoms, to include aircraft over-flight rights.72 After the contiguous 
zone lies the third offshore maritime regime, the EEZ. The EEZ extends 200 
nautical miles from a nation’s coastal baseline or 188 miles seaward beyond a 
state’s twelve-mile territorial sea.73 The Arctic nations have largely worked 
together to resolve their overlapping EEZ claims, of increasing importance to 
Arctic nations as they enjoy sole exploitation rights over all living and nonliv-
ing resources within their respective EEZ.74 The fourth and furthest zone from 
                                                                                                                           
 66 O’ROURKE, supra note 16, at 27–29. 
 67 CIA: Arctic Ocean, supra note 31. 
 68 UNCLOS, supra note 11, arts. 186–191. 
 69 Id. arts. 2–3. 
 70 Id. arts. 2, 56. 
 71 Id. art. 33. 
 72 COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 65, ¶ 1.3.3; UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 36. 
 73 UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 57. Though not a signatory to UNCLOS, the United States estab-
lished a 200-nautical mile EEZ by Presidential Proclamation 5030 on March 10, 1983. Proclamation 
No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 10, 1983). But see O’ROURKE, supra note 16, at 59 (asserting 
that 95% of the Arctic claims to mineral resources are not in dispute). 
 74 See UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 56. In the EEZ, a coastal state has 
2018] Assessing the State of Environmental Law in the World’s Polar Regions 1669 
the coastal state, the high seas, lie outward from the EEZ. The high seas are set 
aside to be “reserved for peaceful purposes”75 and all nations of the world en-
joy complete and total freedom of navigation of the high seas.76 The high seas 
may overlap with a nation’s continental shelf below the surface, which is geo-
graphically limited by UNCLOS to 350 nautical miles.77 
Below the surface and on the seabed, the continental shelf overlaps with 
the four maritime jurisdictions discussed above. The continental shelf consists 
of “mineral and other non-living resources of the sea-bed and subsoil,” of cen-
tral importance to the untapped mineral, oil and gas interests in the Arctic.78 
Under UNCLOS, the continental shelf “may not extend beyond 350 nautical 
miles from the baseline of the territorial sea is measured or 100 nautical miles 
from the 2,500-meter isobath, whichever is greater.”79 Coastal nations can ex-
ercise sovereign rights over the continental shelf for “purpose[s] of exploring 
. . . and exploiting its natural resources”80 and have “exclusive right to author-
ize and regulate drilling on the continental shelf for all purposes.”81 
Although there have been calls from environmental groups (Greenpeace 
and others) to set aside the Arctic region as a worldwide nature reserve, UN-
CLOS already contemplates such an area within its existing maritime regime 
structure in the so-called “Area” beyond the national jurisdiction of any na-
tion.82 A fifth maritime zone, the “Area” lies beyond any nation’s continental 
shelf and is defined as “the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction . . . . [whose resources] are the common her-
itage of mankind.”83 Here, mineral rights are part of the Area.84 Yet, determin-
                                                                                                                           
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing 
the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the sea-
bed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the econom-
ic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the 
water, currents and winds . . . . 
Id. 
 75 Id. art. 88. 
 76 Id. art. 87. 
 77 Id. arts. 76, 86. For example, as a geological matter, it is estimated that the United States’ con-
tinental shelf (via Alaska) may extend upward of 600 nautical miles. But as a legal matter, it cannot 
exceed 350 nautical miles under the limitations set forth in UNCLOS. Id. art. 76. 
 78 Id. art. 77(4). 
 79 COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 65, ¶ 1.7; see also UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 76, 
¶ 5. 
 80 UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 77, ¶ 1. Further, “[t]he rights of the coastal State over the conti-
nental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any express proclamation.” Id. 
art. 77, ¶ 3. 
 81 Id. art. 81. 
 82 Id. preamble, art. 136. 
 83 Id. 
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ing the “Arctic Area” still requires a legally binding ruling on the size and 
breadth of each of the five Arctic coastal states’ continental shelves, which has 
yet to occur. 
Determining the length and breadth of a nation’s continental shelf is key 
to ascertaining the validity of each coastal state’s legal claim to the associated 
natural resource exploitation rights.85 UNCLOS provides both general and 
specific guidance for nations making continental shelf determinations (“de-
limitation”) among states. The general guidance states: 
The delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite 
or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of inter-
national law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.86 
UNCLOS details a more specific continental shelf delimitation procedure 
under Article 76.87 Article 76 outlines a four-step process.88 Of particular im-
                                                                                                                           
 84 Id. art. 136. This provision was not without controversy. Despite leading UNCLOS negotia-
tions, the United States objected to the common heritage of mankind language and has yet to ratify 
UNCLOS. See O’ROURKE, supra note 16, at 11. 
 85 See UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 76. 
 86 Id. art. 83, ¶ 1. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) states that 
the ICJ will decide disputes—such as competing maritime claims—by applying: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly rec-
ognized by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination 
of rules of law. 
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. 
 87 UNCLOS, supra note 11, art.76. UNCLOS states: 
1. The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the subma-
rine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its 
land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical 
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the 
outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance. 
2. The continental shelf of a Coastal states shall not extend beyond the limits provided for 
in paragraphs 4 to 6. 
3. The continental margin comprises the submerged prolongation of the land mass of the 
coasts’ State, and consists of the seabed and subsoil of the shelf, the slope, and the rise. It 
does not include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or subsoil thereof. 
4. (a) For the purposes of the Convention, the coastal State shall establish the outer edge of 
the continental margin wherever the margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, by either: 
(i) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to the outermost 
fixed points at each of which the thickness of sedimentary rocks is at least 1 per cent 
of the shortest distance from such point to the foot of the continental slope; or 
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portance is the undefined term “natural prolongation” that remains a continual 
source of contention and uncertainty.89 The Arctic states are now turning to this 
UNCLOS procedure to make their case for an expanded continental shelf. 
The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (“CLCS”) is cen-
tral to the Article 76 process for adjudicating continental shelf claims.90 But its 
long-term viability to formally resolve all claims remains to be seen. Denmark 
(via Greenland), Norway, and Russia have all made one or more submissions 
to the CLCS to adjudicate competing continental shelf claims; Canada has 
made a partial submission.91 Both Denmark (via Greenland) and Russia claim 
that their continental shelf extends to the North Pole.92 To date, the CLCS has 
received six submissions asserting continental shelf clams in the Arctic, but 
has only acted on one of them.93 Russia submitted the first Article 76 claim in 
2001 but this was rejected for lack of scientific support.94 It resubmitted this 
claim on August 3, 2015.95 In its new submission to the CLCS, the Russian 
government claimed a continental shelf of more than 460,000 miles of the Arc-
tic. Norway submitted an Article 76 claim in 2006 and Denmark submitted a 
claim in 2014. Table 1, below, summarizes CLCS claims.96 
                                                                                                                           
(ii) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to fixed points not 
more than 60 nautical miles from the foot of the continental slope. 
(b) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the foot of the continental slope shall be de-
termined as the point of maximum change in the gradient at its base. 
Id. art. 76(1)–(4). 
 88 See Carpenter, supra note 29, at 224–27. Article 76 applies throughout the world and not just 
the Arctic. See UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 76 (lacking a specific limitation to the Arctic region). 
 89 See Carpenter, supra note 29, at 216–18 (describing numerous claims made by Arctic coastal 
states to extend the boundaries of their continental shelves based upon the argument that certain ridges 
are a natural prolongation of their continental shelves). 
 90 O’ROURKE, supra note 16, at 11–12. The CLCS has received a total of seventy-eight claims 
since UNCLOS entered into force; the vast majority of those claims have been submitted the past ten 
years. Submissions to the CLCS, UNITED NATIONS, DIV. FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE 
SEA (last updated Oct. 26, 2017), http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm 
[https://perma.cc/PY83-2VS2]. 
 91 CIA: Arctic Ocean, supra note 31. 
 92 O’ROURKE, supra note 16, at 17–18. Independent of the CLCS, Norway and Russia have 
signed a bilateral maritime boundary agreement. Although the United States and Canada dispute how 
to divide the Beaufort Sea, (as well as the status of certain Canadian waters—of central importance to 
the Northwest Passage) the United States is actually assisting Canada’s submission to the CLCS. Id. 
 93 The CLCS has only issued a recommendation on Norway’s claim. See Submissions to the CLCS, 
supra note 90 (listing the submissions and recommendations submitted to the CLCS as of October 26, 
2017). If the United States was eligible to make an Article 76 claim, it is anticipated that a natural pro-
longation claim north of Alaska could be the size of California. Carpenter, supra note 29, at 233. 
 94 Andrew Kramer, Russia Stakes New Claim to Expanse in Arctic, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2014, at 
A4 (noting Russia was advised to “reconsider and resubmit its claim”). 
 95 Carpenter, supra note 29, at 232; Submissions to the CLCS, supra note 90. The previous rec-
ommendations of the CLCS to Russia have not been made public. Carpenter, supra note 29, at 232. 
 96 This pertains to the CLCS process. Outside of the UNCLOS-designed CLCS process, custom-
ary international law and governing ICJ jurisprudence would serve as a fallback to guide any Arctic 
1672 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1655 
Table 1. Arctic Continental Shelf Claims97 
Nation Year Claim & Status 
Russia Dec. 
2001 
Russia advised by CLCS to “reconsider and resubmit its 
claim.”* 
Claim resubmitted in 2015 (Decision Pending). 
Norway  Nov. 
2006 
Submission addressed the outer limits of the continental shelf 
in three areas:  (1) Loop Hole in the Barents Sea; (2) the 
Western Nansen Basin in the Arctic Ocean; and the (3) “Ba-
nana Hole” in the Norwegian and Greenland Seas.  
Recommendations from CLCS finalized March 2009.** 
Canada Dec. 
2013 
Partial Submission to the CLCS regarding the Atlantic 
Ocean, but noted that a submission over the Arctic Ocean 
will be forthcoming in 2018.  
(Not yet submitted) 
Denmark Nov. 
2013  
Claim to Northeast continental shelf of Greenland.  
(Decision Pending) 
Denmark Dec. 
2014 
Claim to Northern continental shelf of Greenland.  
(Decision Pending) 
Russia Aug. 
2015 
Partial resubmission of the 2001 claim.  This claim would 
expand Russia’s total territory by 463,000 square miles in the 
“doughnut hole” of international waters encircled by existing 
economic zone boundaries.  
(Decision Pending)*** 
* Kramer, supra note 94. 
** See COMM’N ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF, SUMMARY OF THE RECOMMEN-
DATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF (Mar. 27, 2009), 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor06/nor_rec_summ.pdf [https://
perma.cc/29E8-JWNU]. 
*** Kramer, supra note 94. 
Despite the long-term uncertainty concerning UNCLOS’s ability to re-
solve continental shelf and other areas of concern in the Arctic, the Arctic 
coastal states recently reinforced UNCLOS’s prominent role in resolving dis-
putes in the Arctic. In 2008, outside the auspices of the Arctic Council, the five 
Arctic coastal states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United 
States) signed the Ilulissat Declaration in the face of rising tensions over hy-
drocarbon deposit rights.98 In doing so, all five Arctic coastal states reaffirmed 
                                                                                                                           
territorial dispute. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G./Den.; F.R.G./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 
(Feb. 20) (adjudicating a dispute over delimitation of the North Sea continental shelf arising from 
Special Agreements between Germany and Denmark, and Germany and Norway). Prior ICJ opinions 
on maritime claims indicate that maritime boundary disputes must be made “in accordance with equi-
table principles, and taking account of all the relevant circumstances . . . .” Id. at 53–54. Though this 
does provide a certain amount of flexibility, the enforcement of ICJ opinions remains a continual 
concern. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 508 (2008) (holding that an ICJ decision will not 
have “immediate legal effect in the courts of U.N. members”). 
 97 This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/
law-review-content/BCLR/59-5/nevit-percival-graphics.pdf [ttps://perma.cc/TQ22-835B]. 
 98 The Ilulissat Declaration at the Arctic Ocean Conference 1–2 (May 28, 2008), http://
www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9FT-8SQ3] (The 
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their policy to resolve their disputes in a cooperative manner, renewing their 
commitment to orderly settling overlapping territorial claims via UNCLOS 
processes. Further, the Ilulissat Declaration reaffirmed UNCLOS’s central im-
portance to the Arctic, asserting that the Arctic coastal states do not need a sep-
arate Arctic Treaty or similar comprehensive international legal regime outside 
the work of UNCLOS or the Arctic Council.99 
2. Additional International Environmental Agreements Will Take on 
Increased Importance in the Arctic 
The Arctic’s legal landscape has been described as “a complex lattice-
work of international and national laws in which the applicable law is often 
highly location-dependent.”100 Many international environmental agreements 
described below apply worldwide but have an outsized impact in the Arctic. 
Beyond UNCLOS, these agreements include the Polar Bear Treaty, 101 London 
Dumping Act,102 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
ships,103 Safety of Life at Sea (“SOLAS”), 104 and Convention on the Interna-
tional Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (“COLREGS”). 105 
The 1973 Polar Bear Treaty remains the oldest Arctic-specific treaty in 
existence, placing legally binding requirements on Arctic activities that harm 
the polar bear.106 Signed in 1973 by the five Arctic nations with the largest po-
lar bear populations (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United 
States), the Polar Bear Treaty requires each of the five parties to commit to 
“manage [their] polar bear populations in accordance with sound conservation 
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practices based on the best available scientific data.”107 It expressly prohibits 
killing, hunting, and capturing polar bears, except in limited circumstances.108 
The 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships, as modified by its 1978 Protocol (“MARPOL 73/78”) has the goal of 
eliminating the international pollution of the marine environment. 109 It specifi-
cally addresses Arctic activities. MARPOL 73/78 contains six annexes and fills 
in gaps left by the 1972 London Dumping Convention, described below.110 
Similarly, the London Dumping Convention obligates contracting parties to 
take steps to “prevent the pollution of the sea by the dumping of waste and 
other matter that is liable to create hazards to human health, [and] to harm liv-
ing resources . . . .”111 There are designated “special areas” within MARPOL 
that place higher pollution standards based upon ecological and technical char-
acteristics that are unique to that area. Within MARPOL, three of these special 
area annexes apply to Antarctica (oil, noxious liquid substances, and garbage) 
but none currently apply to the Arctic.112 
The 1974 SOLAS Convention, as modified by its 1978 and 1988 Proto-
cols, ensures that signatory flag states comply with a certain minimum level of 
safety precautions.113  
The COLREGS, commonly known as the “International Rules of the 
Road” complements UNCLOS, operationalizing many of its navigational provi-
sions. It provides detailed rules relating to vessel operation, traffic separation, 
rights of way, rules of the road and actions to avoid collisions.114 These rules 
apply to all international waters (beyond the territorial sea).115 Except in cases 
where a coastal nation has established different rules over its sovereign waters, 
COLREGS also applies in each nation’s territorial sea and inland waters.116 
COLREGS will take on increased importance in the Arctic with the rise of ship-
ping traffic in the region.117 COLREGS also lack Arctic-specific provisions.118 
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An Arctic or polar annex could be added into COLREGS to provide additional 
safety measures in light of the increased maritime traffic in the region. 
II. ANTARCTICA: AN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SUCCESS STORY ANCHORED 
BY THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM 
A. Defining Antarctica 
The ATS encompasses the area below sixty degrees south latitude includ-
ing both land and sea.119 As shown in Figure 2 of the Appendix,120 the conti-
nent itself is largely circular in shape and measures 5.5 million square miles, 
ten percent of Earth’s total land area.121 A vast ice sheet that is up to four kilo-
meters thick covers ninety-eight percent of this land area.122 The ice sheet con-
tains roughly three quarters of the world’s fresh water.123 Yet, Antarctica is also 
the driest continent on the planet, receiving 1.2 to 2 inches of rainfall annually, 
which is less than that of the Sahara Desert.124 Climatic conditions are harsh, 
with average winter temperatures ranging from negative thirty degrees Celsius 
on the coast to negative seventy degrees inland.125 These temperatures do not 
include the chilling effect of prevailing high winds.126 In the summer, tempera-
tures can rise to around fifty degrees Fahrenheit in the warmest part of the con-
tinent.127 
A century ago, expeditions to Antarctica made Amundsen, Scott, Maw-
son, and Shackleton household names. Today Antarctica’s pristine environment 
attracts tourists to what is the coldest, windiest, and highest continent on earth. 
The cold and inhospitable climate means Antarctica is home to relatively few 
terrestrial plant species; there are about 800 species of land plants—about 350 
of which are lichens—and no trees, grasses, or shrubs are present.128 
No terrestrial vertebrate species are native to Antarctica. Only about thirty 
species of terrestrial fauna are present—the largest of these, the wingless 
midge, is only about three millimeters long.129 There are about fifty species of 
birds present in Antarctica. The most abundant by far are penguins, accounting 
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for about sixty-five percent of Antarctic bird stock or ninety percent of total 
bird biomass. Other abundant species include albatrosses and petrels.130 
Marine life in the Southern Ocean around Antarctica is rich and abundant. 
Strong currents and frontal zones churn up nutrients from bottom water, stimu-
lating photosynthesis. The availability of light is the single most important fac-
tor in the extent of primary production. There is hardly any daylight during 
winter months and light cannot penetrate through ice. The most productive 
areas of the ocean are along the continental shelf and in the Antarctic Conver-
gence zone.131 
B. Antarctic Treaty System 
The Antarctic Treaty (“AT”) was signed on December 1, 1959 and entered 
into force on June 23, 1961.132 It has two main objectives: (1) restricting the 
use of Antarctica to peaceful purposes; and (2) promoting scientific re-
search.133 Some scholars view the AT as a product of Cold War tensions be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union.134 Although neither the United 
States nor Russia officially claimed any part of Antarctica, both were express-
ing strong interest in doing so. In 1947, the United States actually had a resolu-
tion called “Operation Highjump, the purpose of which was to establish the 
strongest possible basis for a territorial claim to as much of the continent as 
possible.”135 
Global scientific cooperation during the International Geophysical Year 
(“IGY”) of 1957–58 sparked interest in negotiating what became the AT.136 
This year of scientific interchange is widely believed to have smoothed the 
way for the AT as “the friendship and cooperation that emerged from the IGY 
fostered a belief among claimant governments that disputes over sovereignty 
could be set aside in the interest of peace and mutual scientific benefits.”137 
The twelve countries that participated in the IGY (Argentina, Australia, 
Belgium, Chile, France, Great Britain, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South 
Africa, the Soviet Union, and the United States) signed the AT in 1959. The 
treaty suspends territorial sovereignty claims made by seven countries (includ-
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ing overlapping claims by Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom).138 Arti-
cle 4 of the AT is of central importance. It states: 
No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force 
shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting, or denying a claim 
to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sover-
eignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing 
claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while 
the present Treaty is in force.139 
This provision is central to the long-term success of the AT as it effectively 
halted new sovereignty claims over Antarctica. 
Passed during a time of military tension between the United States and 
the Soviet Union, the AT was the first arms control agreement of the Cold War. 
The AT prohibits in Antarctica “any measures of a military nature, such as the 
establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military 
maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons.”140 Nuclear explo-
sions are specifically prohibited in Antarctica.141 
The AT protects freedom of scientific investigation while subjecting sci-
entific personnel to the jurisdiction of their respective governments. Important 
protections for Antarctic plants and wildlife were added by the Agreed 
Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, adopted as an 
annex to the treaty in 1964,142 and the Convention for the Conservation of Ant-
arctic Seals,143 which entered into force in 1978. 
When the AT was negotiated, multiple scientific stations had already been 
established on the continent and surrounding islands. Waste disposal practices 
at these bases initially were quite haphazard, including at the large U.S. base 
on McMurdo Sound.144 The United States actually operated a small nuclear 
power plant at the station between 1962 and 1972, which had to be decommis-
sioned prematurely due to continuing safety issues.145 A campaign by Green-
peace to expose open dumping of wastes at McMurdo helped spur improved 
waste disposal practices.146 
                                                                                                                           
 138 Id. at 57. 
 139 The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 119, art. IV, ¶ 2. 
 140 Id. art. I, ¶ 1. 
 141 Id. art. V, ¶ 1. 
 142 Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, June 2, 1964, 17 U.S.T. 
991; Timo Koivurova, Environmental Protection in the Arctic and Antarctic: Can the Polar Regimes 
Learn from Each Other?, 33 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 204, 212–13 (2005). 
 143 Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1, 1972, 29 U.S.T. 441; Koivurova, supra note 142, at 
207. 
 144 JOYNER, supra note 119, at 21. 
 145 Id. at 59 n.15. 
 146 Malcolm W. Browne, In Once-Pristine Antarctica, a Complicated Cleanup Begins, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 19, 1989, at C1. 
1678 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1655 
In 1993, the Environmental Defense Fund won a lawsuit against the Na-
tional Science Foundation to block construction of a waste incinerator at 
McMurdo without an environmental impact statement. The D.C. Circuit held 
that because Antarctica was not the territory of any one sovereign, the principle 
against extraterritorial application of domestic law (here the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act) did not apply.147 Writing for the court, Judge Mikva fo-
cused on the unique legal status of Antarctica. Noting that Antarctica is an “in-
ternational anomaly” and “the only continent on earth which has never been, 
and is not now, subject to the sovereign rule of any nation,” Judge Mikva clas-
sified Antarctica as a true “global common” analogous to outer space.148 
C. Regulation of Mineral Extraction in Antarctica 
The original ATS did not provide for any system to regulate mineral ex-
traction in Antarctica.149 In the years after the Treaty came into force, there was 
a growing awareness among the Consultative Parties that the gap needed to be 
filled; in 1981, the Parties officially agreed to prepare an agreement governing 
mineral extraction.150 After six years of Special Consultative meetings, the fi-
nal text of the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource 
Activities (“CRAMRA”) was adopted on June 2, 1988.151 
At the time the Parties started negotiations, there was widespread agree-
ment among government representatives and industry specialists that mineral 
exploitation was not imminent both because it was technologically infeasible 
and because commercially exploitable deposits either did not exist or were un-
known.152 Instead, the Parties acknowledged that it would be easier to negoti-
ate a minerals regime before any important deposits were found because dis-
covery of minerals would tend to entrench sovereignty claims.153 In spite of 
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seemingly insurmountable technological constraints and lack of actual evi-
dence, speculation of an Antarctic mineral rush had been growing in the 1970s. 
Indeed, “spectacular claims were made for a ‘Middle East’ in the Antarctic, 
including an assertion by the Wall Street Journal that oil reserves reported by 
the United States Geological Survey almost matched the proven reserves of the 
entire United States.”154 
Six years of negotiation resulted in a comprehensive agreement that cov-
ered prospecting, exploration, and exploitation of mineral resources.155 Even 
though it did not ban mining, CRAMRA’s measures to protect the environment 
were not insignificant. “[I]t stipulated a series of strict environmental condi-
tions that future operators might find hard to satisfy” and “arguably contained 
some of the most stringent safeguards in any treaty on the environment.”156 
But CRAMRA’s fatal flaw lies in the fact that mineral exploitation is in-
timately connected with territorial sovereignty.157 In order to maintain their 
claims, claimant states would have to assert their authority to regulate mining 
activity. But other nations like the United States and Russia refused to recog-
nize these sovereignty claims and reacted poorly to attempts by national gov-
ernments to regulate.158 Because the ATS kicked the can of worms that is sov-
ereignty disputes down the road, disagreements about mining activities would 
have the potential to undermine the whole treaty.159 
Although no mining activity seemed imminent, CRAMRA clearly envi-
sioned that mining activity could potentially take place in the future. One prin-
cipal motivation for opposing CRAMRA “was a legitimate fear that the regime 
. . . would make it too affordable for the industry to resist leaping into immedi-
ate activity. The adoption of a regulated regime like CRAMRA would signifi-
cantly lower uncertainty costs, facilitate investment, and permit untested tech-
nologies to risk massive environmental harm.”160 This stiffened the resistance 
of the environmental community. 
The worst environmental disaster in Antarctic history occurred in January 
1989 when the Bahia Paraiso, an Argentine naval supply ship, hit a submerged 
rock off the United States’ Palmer Research Station, spilling 250,000 gallons of 
diesel into the ocean and “kill[ing] thousands of krill and scores of penguins and 
other seabirds . . . .”161 The abandonment of CRAMRA and the adoption of the 
Madrid Protocol, however, was not due exclusively to environmental concern. 
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In addition to the awareness that, for the foreseeable future, any 
mineral extraction activities in the Antarctic would be devoid of 
commercial significance, the major factors were: (1) fears that 
CRAMRA would disturb the sensitive balance of sovereignty in the 
Antarctic; (2) a political-ideological critique of the Consultative Par-
ties, from a group of developing countries in the UN; (3) pressures 
from environmental NGOs; and (4) domestic policy considerations 
which related to the above factors.162 
This resistance culminated in Australia announcing its opposition to the 
Convention.163 Australia was joined by France a few months later.164 The with-
drawal of Australia and France instantly killed the convention because alt-
hough it had been adopted in 1988, in order for it to go into force, it had to be 
ratified by the sixteen consultative parties, which included all of the claimant 
states (including Australia and France).165 Australia and France countered with 
another proposal that eventually became the Madrid Protocol. 
D. Protocol on Environmental Protection to the  
Antarctic Treaty (“Madrid Protocol”) 
The most important environmental protections for Antarctica are found in 
the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the AT, known as the Madrid Pro-
tocol.166 The Protocol, which was adopted in 1991, designates the continent as 
a “natural reserve, devoted to peace and science”167 and imposes strict 
measures to protect the Antarctic environment, including a ban on all min-
ing.168 The Madrid Protocol was negotiated with remarkable speed, emerging 
out of just three meetings in 1990 and 1991 before it was adopted on October 
4, 1991.169 Not only does it ban mining altogether, but it also contains far-
reaching measures for environmental protection.170 
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The Madrid Protocol states that all activities should conform to environ-
mental principles, including prior assessment of their environmental impacts. It 
provides for the establishment of a Committee for Environmental Protection to 
advise the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, and it requires the develop-
ment of contingency plans to respond to environmental emergencies.171 Annex 
III governs which wastes that can be discharged within and which have to be 
removed from Antarctica. It also regulates human waste and incineration, and 
mandates the implementation of waste management plans.172 Annex IV gov-
erns how ships dispose of waste, and the practices it adopts are largely in har-
mony with corresponding MARPOL annexes.173 Annex V governs “area pro-
tection and management,” providing that “any area, including any marine area, 
may be designated as an Antarctic Specially Protected Area or an Antarctic 
Specially Managed Area.”174 
The key to the success of the AT has been its ability to defuse claims of 
national sovereignty over Antarctica. The Madrid Protocol’s ban on mining 
prevents commercial pressures from threatening the continued vitality of the 
ATS. But some commentators doubt the effectiveness of the Protocol if and 
when minerals are found. One notes that when minerals are eventually discov-
ered, “the Protocol will prove to be fundamentally unrealistic, and its chances 
of survival will be virtually nil.”175 With the demise of CRAMRA, there will 
not be any regulatory regime in place to govern mineral extraction in Antarcti-
ca. “The Antarctic environment will be basically unprotected and the Antarctic 
Treaty System will face the greatest crisis of its lifetime.”176 Another asks 
“[w]hat will happen to environmental concerns when opportunities for poten-
tially large economic gains are made plainly available for governments willing 
to exploit the Antarctic environment? The answer is self-evident and leaves but 
scant room for optimism among concerned conservationists.”177 
In the early twentieth century, extensive whaling by vessels from several 
countries decimated whale populations in Antarctica.178 Many have recovered, 
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but spotting blue whales, the heaviest creatures ever to inhabit the earth, is still 
a rare event.179 In March 2014 the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) ruled 
that Japanese whaling in Antarctic waters violated the International Whaling 
Commission’s ban on commercial whaling.180 Japan was taken to the ICJ by 
Australia and New Zealand, which argued that Japanese whaling had been so 
extensive that it could not possibly qualify for the exception for whaling for 
purposes of scientific research.181 Japan has pledged to resume whaling with a 
scaled-back program that will kill only minke whales.182 
Enforcement of strict measures to protect the Antarctic environment de-
pends crucially on cooperation by many governments and private entities. In 
December 2014 the New Zealand navy confronted a boat illegally catching sea 
bass (toothfish) in Antarctic waters. Rough waters prevented New Zealand au-
thorities from boarding the vessel, rumored to be owned by a Spanish crime 
syndicate. The New Zealand navy informed Interpol in hopes of preventing the 
boats from offloading their illegal catch.183 Ultimately Sea Shepherd, an NGO, 
chased the vessel for 110 days over 10,250 nautical miles before it was scuttled 
off the west coast of Africa.184 In 2011 the International Maritime Organization 
banned the use of heavy fuel oils by ships in Antarctic waters.185 
III. THE FUTURE OF ARCTIC GOVERNANCE AND THE RISE OF  
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
A. Comparing and Contrasting the Polar Regions 
Commonalities and contrasts mark the polar regions: both are of similar 
size, share a similar climate, and are geographically isolated. And climate 
change is having an outsized effect on both polar regions, which harbor signif-
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icant natural resources (oil, gas, and minerals in the Arctic; minerals in Antarc-
tica). But they are geographical opposites, which inform geopolitical norms: 
the Arctic region encompasses “an ocean surrounded by continents” whereas 
the Antarctic region encompasses “a continent surrounded by oceans.” The 
Arctic has two rapidly growing trade routes that have the potential to transform 
worldwide maritime shipping traffic. Although both regions are geographically 
isolated, Antarctica is significantly more so, with no permanent population and 
less than 50,000 visitors per year, nearly twenty percent of whom do not dis-
embark from their ships.186 The Arctic region is geopolitically much more 
complex, with land and territories belonging to different nations and indige-
nous peoples. 
Further, both polar regions face enormous environmental challenges due 
to climate change.187 In Antarctica, the ATS ban on commercial exploitation 
has preserved a pristine environment unlike anything on earth. Yet, the melting 
of the Arctic ice sheets is non-linear and influenced by the “albedo effect”—
the more the ice melts, the warmer the water becomes, accelerating and aggra-
vating the melting process.188 As this climate change exposes more previously 
ice-covered areas, private industry is becoming increasingly interested in ac-
cessing the Arctic’s untapped natural resources.189  
The ATS now includes twenty-nine nations as consultative parties and 
twenty-four nations as non-consultative parties.190 The Arctic Council includes 
eight permanent members with full voting rights, as well as non-voting other 
governmental organizations and indigenous tribes.191 The diverse permanent 
population that calls the Arctic home is of critical importance for future envi-
ronmental governance in the Arctic.192 The Arctic polar region is home to near-
ly four million people in seven countries, each subject to the jurisdiction of 
                                                                                                                           
 186 News Release, Int’l Ass’n of Antarctica Tour Operators, Antarctic Tourism Figures Released 
as IAATO’s 25th Anniversary Meeting Begins (2016), https://iaato.org/documents/10157/1278700/
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ats_parties.aspx?lang=e [https://perma.cc/GF5K-78G4]. 
 191 See O’ROURKE, supra note 16, at 2, 40. 
 192 Erika Lennon, A Tale of Two Poles: A Comparative Look at the Legal Regimes in the Arctic 
and the Antarctic, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, Spring 2008, at 32, 32. 
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their respective host nation.193 These populations are increasingly vulnerable to 
climate change’s effects and will bear the brunt of climate change’s costs.194 
Since the AT’s entry into force, there has been an increase in global awareness 
of environmental justice issues and the critically important role that non-state 
actors and indigenous peoples play in international environmental agreements. 
Table 2, below, presents a snapshot of the two polar regions. 
Table 2. Comparative Geographies of the Arctic and Antarctic195 
 Arctic Antarctica 
Climate Polar Polar 
Size 5.5 million square miles* 5.4 million square miles** 
Geography 
Maritime-based with some 
land mass 
Land-based with some mari-
time aspects 
Interested States 8*** 53**** 
Natural Resources 
Significant Oil and Gas 
Resources 
Significant Mineral Re-
sources 
Military activities prohib-
ited? 
No Yes 
Permanent Population? Yes No***** 
* This is based upon the MIT Woods Hole definition of “Arctic.” 
** This includes only the land continent of Antarctica and not the entire Antarctic polar 
region. 
*** Although more than eight nations are interested parties to the Arctic, this number re-
flects the eight Arctic nations that are members of the Arctic Council. There are also twelve 
non-Arctic states that are increasingly playing a role in the Arctic Council, including China. 
See, e.g., Hans H. Hertell, Arctic Melt: The Tipping Point for an Arctic Treaty, 21 GEO. 
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 565 (2008). 
**** Reflects number of Parties to the Antarctic Treaty. The Antarctic Treaty, SECRETARIAT 
OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYS., http://www.ats.aq/e/ats.htm [https://perma.cc/U7RF-
R9Q8]. 
***** There are no permanent inhabitants in Antarctica, although there are numerous long-
term residents at several scientific research centers. From 2016–2017, Antarctica received 
around 45,083 visitors, nearly 17% of whom did not leave their ships. See Tourism Statis-
tics: 2016–2017 Statistics, INT’L ASS’N OF ANTARCTIC TOUR OPERATORS, http://iaato.
org/tourism-statistics [https://perma.cc/W587-TNW4] (providing annual data on tourists 
who stay on their ships (“Cruise Only”) and those who disembark (“Landed”), broken down 
by nationality). 
In large part because of the geographic differences, the two polar regions 
have emerged as polar opposites in their respective legal regimes. In light of 
the ATS success and increasing interest in the Arctic, questions naturally arise. 
                                                                                                                           
 193 O’ROURKE, supra note 16, at 53. 
 194 One study commissioned by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers estimated that 178 communi-
ties in Alaska are at risk due to soil erosion exacerbated by climate change. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF 
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 195 This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/
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Should the Arctic region move to an Antarctica model and be preserved as a 
maritime wilderness, similar to the AT?196 This common heritage of mankind 
formulation does not appeal to Arctic coastal states who are eager to exploit its 
significant untapped resources, but this approach is favored by non-Arctic 
states such as China.197 Further, the “Arctic as wilderness area” model is also 
impractical due to the heightened interest in the Arctic’s resources and the ex-
isting maritime jurisdictional regimes set forth in UNCLOS. Indeed, under 
UNCLOS, the surface area beyond the nation’s EEZ is already set aside for 
peaceful purposes.198 And the area on the subsurface beyond the continental 
shelf is outside the national jurisdiction of any one nation and part of the 
“common heritage of mankind.”199 Once the continental shelf claims are final-
ly adjudicated by the CLCS, a “doughnut hole” will emerge as a default com-
mons Arctic Area.200 
Nevertheless, when looking for a model for Arctic governance, the ATS 
success should not be dismissed out of hand. A remarkable and enduring ex-
ample of nations coming together to preserve and protect a common treasure, 
the ATS should serve as an enlightened model for future Arctic management. 
But its long-term success is also not ensured. The Madrid Protocol’s prohibi-
tion of mining in Antarctica is not necessarily permanent. Climate change, too, 
is beginning to dramatically impact access to Antarctica and undermine the 
stability of its ice shelf.201 As nations rush to expand their presence on the con-
tinent, many believe this uniquely successful legal regime will not persist in-
definitely as new economic opportunities emerge.202 Efforts to amend the AT 
to create an opening for resource extraction in the Antarctic should be resisted. 
In 2048, fifty years after the Madrid Protocol entered into force, any consulta-
tive party may call for a review.203 If no action is taken, the ban will contin-
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ue.204 If a country desires to leave the Protocol, however, section 5(b) of Arti-
cle 25 contains a “walk-out clause.”205 Theoretically, a country could propose a 
revision to allow mining on the continent. If this revision is not adopted in 
three years, that country has the power to unilaterally leave the Protocol and 
presumably commence mining activities. Efforts should be made to preserve 
the current global consensus in favor of preservation of Antarctica’s natural 
resources.206 
B. The Rise of Global Environmental Law and Its  
Significance in the Polar Regions 
The ATS was adopted at a time when legally binding international treaties 
were more in vogue and there was less understanding and weight placed on 
non-state actors and indigenous peoples.207 Indeed, since the passage of the AT 
in 1959 there has been an evolutionary shift in international environmental 
awareness and global environmental law governance, away from “hard law” 
international treaties toward “bottom up” and “soft law” cooperative approach-
es involving private and public partnerships.208 Even countries with very dif-
ferent legal and political traditions are borrowing law and regulatory innova-
tions from one another, blurring traditional distinctions between international 
and domestic law, and between private and public law. This phenomenon has 
been described by scholars as “global environmental law.”209 Multilateral trea-
ties, though an important and enduring component of international environ-
mental law, no longer provide the sole option to solve complex environmental 
issues. 
1. Global Environmental Law and Arctic Indigenous Peoples 
Arctic environmental governance has evolved in a manner that reflects 
this new global environmental reality. In fact, the Arctic Council grew out of 
an earlier environmental partnership and has demonstrated an ability to devel-
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op legally binding agreements that address emerging Arctic issues.210 And its 
soft law focus should complement and not subtract from the legal framework 
and processes set forth in UNCLOS. This is visible via the collaborative nature 
of the Arctic Council’s work and private sector initiatives designed to control 
the environmental impact of tourism. We believe that the Arctic Council’s 
work will continue to evolve and serve as a testing ground for global environ-
mental law’s ability to solve thorny international environmental issues across a 
diverse set of stakeholders. Indeed, the Arctic Council has already demonstrat-
ed an ability to collaborate and address myriad emerging problems. This holds 
great promise for the future of Arctic governance.211 
Global environmental law provides several advantages, which fit within 
the existing Arctic governance model. For example, it more easily accommo-
dates state and non-state actors and has lower barriers to stakeholder entry.212 
This is of particular relevance for the Arctic, which includes numerous indige-
nous peoples. The Arctic Council affords six organizations representing Arctic 
indigenous tribes permanent participant status, and it grants observer status to 
non-Arctic states, intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organization, and 
non-governmental organizations.213 Hard law treaties have comparably higher 
legal barriers to entry whose signatories are often limited to state actors.214 
The Arctic Council model is well situated to address the concerns of the 
myriad indigenous populations who reside in the Arctic. Their voice is of cen-
tral importance for long-term Arctic cooperation and governance. But their 
legal status varies widely from nation to nation, adding an additional yet an-
other layer of complexity.215 And they often adhere to their own custom, tradi-
tions and tribal laws. For example, indigenous peoples have inhabited Alaska 
in the Arctic region for thousands of years. Under U.S. domestic law, native 
tribes residing in the United States possess certain sovereign powers with Na-
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tive American jurisdictions “separate but dependent” on the United States.216 
Although the 1971 Alaska Native Claims Act effectively eliminated tribal title 
and land and water claims, governmental policy stresses the need to consult 
tribal governments, to the greatest extent practicable and legally permitted, 
prior to taking actions that affect federally recognized tribal governments.217 
In light of the diverse group of stakeholders across nations, indigenous 
people, non-governmental organizations and public and private institutions, 
global environmental law will only take on increased importance in the Arctic. 
Additionally, the “soft law” provisions that are the hallmark of global envi-
ronmental law have the inherent flexibility to evolve organically and harden 
into legal obligations. Consider the successful signing of both the 2011 
Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue 
in the Arctic and 2013 Agreement on Marine Pollution and Response. Both 
grew out of the work of the Arctic Council, placed legal obligations on Arctic 
states, and appear to address additional issues beyond the mere environmental 
mandate.218 
2. Global Environmental Law and International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) Adoption of Polar Codes 
Outside the work of the Arctic Council, the IMO has taken steps to ad-
dress shipboard safety and design in the polar regions. The IMO Assembly has 
adopted a Resolution to develop guidelines for ships operating in polar waters 
that would go beyond the guidelines set forth in the SOLAS and MARPOL 
Conventions (Polar Code).219 In November 2014, the IMO adopted the “Inter-
national Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters,” and related amendments 
to SOLAS. 220 These new regulations apply to both the Arctic and Antarctica, 
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with the goal of providing additional protection for seafarers and passengers 
operating in the harsh polar environments. 
These Polar Codes will be implemented via both SOLAS and MARPOL 
and cover ship design, operational and training concerns, as well as the protec-
tion of the polar environment.221 The regulations strengthened restrictions on 
waste disposal by ships operating in these waters beginning in January 2017.222 
The new rules ban all discharges of oil residues from ship engines and chemi-
cals used to clean ships and their tanks.223 They require food waste to be 
ground up and disposed at least fourteen miles from land or the nearest ice 
formation.224 The new rules complement the rules on ship design and equip-
ment for vessels operating in polar waters adopted by the IMO in November 
2014.225 Environmental groups welcomed the new rules, while arguing that a 
ban on ships using bunker fuel, which already applies in Antarctic waters, 
should be extended to Arctic waters. 226 Some countries, led by Russia, blocked 
the proposal to ban bunker fuels in Arctic waters when it was made several 
years before.227 
Private sector efforts have also sought to bolster environmental safe-
guards in the polar regions. Beginning in 1991, tour operators formed the In-
ternational Association of Antarctic Tour Operators (“IAATO”), a private, self-
regulating organization that now has more than 100 members.228 IAATO has 
developed a strict code of conduct designed to “keep Antarctica pristine,” to 
“protect Antarctic wildlife,” and to require tourists to “respect protected are-
as.”229 This code strictly regulates what tourists can do in Antarctica to mini-
mize their environmental impact.230 A similar organization, the Association of 
Arctic Expedition Cruise Operators was formed in 2003.231 It has formulated 
extensive guidelines to regulate tourist activity in the Arctic. These include 
operational guidelines that are mandatory for tour operators and guidelines 
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governing tourist encounters with Arctic wildlife, biosecurity guidelines, and 
rules for visiting specific Arctic sites.232 These private initiatives illustrate new 
ways in which global environmental law is developing. 
IV. THE FIVE KEY FACTORS AFFECTING THE FUTURE  
OF ARCTIC GOVERNANCE 
There is widespread consensus that the ATS has played the central role in 
ensuring peace and stability in Antarctica.233 If this global success story could 
be replicated in the Arctic, present and future generations would benefit. But 
Antarctica is just different enough from the Arctic to make this unworkable. 
Antarctica is a continent, not an ocean, it lacks native indigenous populations, 
it is significantly more isolated, it possesses fewer natural resources, and is of 
less military value. It is also a product of a time in history predating the rise of 
global environmental law. 
Will the work of the Arctic Council and the legal processes set forth in 
UNCLOS be enough to stabilize the Arctic in the face of massive geographic 
and environmental change? Perhaps. But this will depend on a multiplicity of 
factors. We believe that the long-term environmental and geopolitical stability 
in the Arctic will depend on five key factors in particular: (1) the ability of 
UNCLOS and the CLCS to finally adjudicate competing continental shelf 
claims; (2) long-term Russian military ambition in the Arctic and Russia’s cor-
responding relationship with the four Arctic coastal state NATO members; (3) 
the true pace of climate change in the Arctic; (4) the impact of changing prices 
of oil and gas on the economics of Arctic resource extraction; and (5) the po-
tential for division among the myriad Arctic stakeholders. These factors are 
discussed in greater detail below. 
A. First Factor: UNCLOS and the CLCS’s Long-Term Viability to  
Decide Competing Continental Shelf Claims 
The first key factor, the ability of UNCLOS and the CLCS to finalize com-
peting continental shelf claims will come to the fore as the CLCS begins to issue 
opinions in response to the uptick in Arctic continental shelf submissions. UN-
CLOS already provides the hard law legal architecture for the Arctic with a 
ready-made process to solve competing continental shelf claims. As of this writ-
ing, 168 nations have ratified UNCLOS, including all of the Arctic states and 
members of the Arctic Council, with the exception of the United States.234 But 
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uncertainty remains regarding the CLCS’s ability to serve as the one-stop adju-
dicatory body in the Arctic. Indeed, the long-term viability for the CLCS to ad-
judicate all claims in a peaceful, effective, and internationally accepted manner 
remains to be seen in light of the two related sub-factors outlined below. 
1. The United States Has Not Ratified UNCLOS, Nor Is There a Timeline 
to Do So 
One of the five Arctic coastal states, the United States, has yet to ratify 
UNCLOS. Hence, it remains unclear whether the United States could even 
make a claim via the CLCS process (it has yet to do so).235 As the Arctic polar 
icecap melts and nations assert their autonomy over the seabed, the CLCS pro-
cess should, in theory, incentivize nations to ratify UNCLOS. In light of its 
growing importance in the Arctic, the United States’ focus should continue to 
be on ratifying UNCLOS, thus ensuring a seat at the table for future Arctic 
governance issues. The United States should then follow up with its own 
CLCS submission outlining the scope and breadth of Alaska’s continental 
shelf, completing the critical fifth wedge of the “Arctic orange.” But this is 
unlikely to occur, and could undermine the UNCLOS and CLCS architecture. 
In the most recent Arctic strategy, President Obama reiterated the desire 
for the United States to accede to UNCLOS in order to “maximize legal cer-
tainty and best secure international recognition of our sovereign rights . . . .”236 
But there is no timeline or foreseeable plan to ratify it as the current admin-
istration has not made similar statements on Arctic policy. Further, there is no 
apparent desire among the Arctic coastal states to sign a more comprehensive 
AT.237 In the absence of U.S. Senate ratification, and in light of the environ-
mental and national security impacts of a changing Arctic environment, some 
have argued that the United States should accede to UNCLOS via a congres-
sional-executive agreement or executive agreement that implements key UN-
CLOS provisions that resolve sovereignty claims.238 This would not necessari-
                                                                                                                           
2017), http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm [https://
perma.cc/F6HQ-5EQ7]. There has been some discussion of bypassing Senate ratification and having 
UNCLOS apply to the United States via a congressional-executive agreement. Although the United 
States has yet to ratify UNCLOS, it does accept the “balance of interests relating to traditional uses of 
the oceans—such as navigation and over-flight.” Statement on United States Oceans Policy, 1 PUB. 
PAPERS 378, 379 (Mar. 10, 1983). 
 235 See O’ROURKE, supra note 16, at 11–12. 
 236 WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC REGION 9 (May 2013), https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf [https://perma.cc/
JGB5-AWFE]. 
 237 See Ilulissat Declaration, supra note 98 (stating that the signatory nations remain committed to 
the law of the sea). 
 238 See King, supra note 56, at 329–30 (proposing that a congressional-executive agreement on 
the Arctic is in the best interest of the United States). 
1692 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1655 
ly require Senate ratification as the President could potentially assert that this 
falls within his Article II foreign relations and Commander in Chief’s powers. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to comprehensively address the 
different types of international agreements under constitutional law, problems 
would still remain in the unlikely event that the President sought to bypass the 
Senate: the agreement would necessarily be limited in scope and would face 
the threat of being undone by future presidents.239 
Ratification has the wide support of the military, which already complies 
with the major UNCLOS navigational provisions and treats them as customary 
international law.240 Despite wide support for its ratification by all former U.S. 
Presidents, business leaders, and environmentalists, a clear path for its ratifica-
tion does not exist. Decades after UNCLOS was launched, the Arctic nations 
who already have acceded to UNCLOS cannot and should not hold their 
breath. 
2. The CLCS’s Ability to Issue Binding Recommendations Accepted by 
Arctic Stakeholders Remains Uncertain 
Second, the long-term legal effect of CLCS recommendations remains 
unknown. The twenty-one member CLCS—comprised only of UNCLOS sig-
natories—“make[s] recommendations to coastal states . . . . The limits of the 
shelf established by a coastal State on the basis of these recommendations 
shall be final and binding.”241 A CLCS determination would likely only be 
binding on the state submitting the claim.242 In practice, it is only after the 
coastal state accepts the CLCS recommendation that it is final and binding.243 
What if other states object? What is the process if a submitting state disagrees 
with the CLCS’s recommendation? If the coastal state objects to another 
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coastal state’s delineation, it remains unclear what the process is to resolve 
such differences.244 And the CLCS appeals process remains unclear. In sum, it 
is only when all five members of the “Arctic orange” submit claims, that the 
CLCS would have a full picture of the competing claims and could then issue 
recommendations that take all of them into account. Time will tell if the CLCS 
will be able to meet this underlying uncertainty. 
B. Second Factor: Russia Ambitions and Russia-NATO  
Relations in the Arctic 
The second factor, Russia’s military ambitions in the Arctic and corre-
sponding Russian-NATO relations have re-emerged in recent years and will con-
tinue to take on increased importance. Geopolitically, Russia has the most to 
gain in the opening of the Arctic and its seaways. Russia possesses the largest 
Arctic continental shelf of any nation (with enormous natural gas stores) and the 
Northeast Passage travels through Russian maritime waters, hugging its coast. 
And, the only border between Russia and the United States is in the Arctic re-
gion. Although the Arctic was a Cold War hotspot in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
United States and Soviet Union have found areas of agreement in the Arctic 
through the signing of the 1990 Maritime Boundary Dispute Agreement. 
Determining the precise contours of Russia’s continental shelf claim re-
mains the central unresolved issue for Arctic oil and gas extraction. In 2007, 
with great media attention, a Russian submarine planted a flag on the seabed 
beneath the North Pole.245 Widely reported in the media but dismissed by legal 
scholars and many world leaders, this seemingly isolated event may have omi-
nously foreshadowed Russian military involvement elsewhere.246 Russia’s 
Lomonosov Ridge, an area whose maximum width is 1,000 miles in an area of 
nearly 1.5 million miles, is of critical importance to future Arctic govern-
ance.247 The Lomonosov Ridge could feasibly provide Russia with half of the 
Arctic for natural resource exploitation.248 Russia recently submitted a follow-
up submission to the CLCS in 2015, asserting that two ridges in the Arctic 
Ocean were a natural prolongation of Russian land territory.249 
Future Russian-NATO relations highlight the Arctic Council’s Achilles 
heel: its express prohibition on addressing matters of military security.250 Of 
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the five Arctic coastal states, four are members of NATO. 251 A period of rela-
tive calm followed in the aftermath of the Cold War with few military maneu-
vers by NATO or Russia in the Arctic. Under Article 5 of the NATO Defense 
Treaty, NATO members are obligated to come to the defense of other members 
in the event of an armed attack.252 
Russia recently has turned its attention to the Arctic in earnest, investing 
in military infrastructure to include the establishment of a new naval base in 
the Arctic.253 Outside the Arctic, Russia has shown a willingness to challenge 
sovereign borders in Crimea and the Ukraine.254 Though it is impossible to 
predict whether Russian aggression in Crimea or the Ukraine will be mirrored 
in the Arctic, Russia does not have a rosy view of NATO’s Arctic role, recently 
designating NATO as “the primary national security threat in the Arctic 
. . . .”255 
Even though the United States possesses the largest military with the 
strongest capability in the world, its capabilities and capacity to operate are 
wanting in the Arctic. Russia has invested in significant military infrastructure 
in the Arctic in recent years while the United States has lagged far behind. The 
United States has shown an increased interest in the Arctic through the release 
of several policy documents, but funding and Arctic operational capabilities 
have not kept pace.256 Although the new Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, 
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recently reiterated the Arctic’s importance to the Department of Defense in 
congressional testimony,257 the United States lacks sufficient icebreaking ca-
pacity, critical to operating effectively and continually in the Arctic. Russia 
possesses relatively strong military capabilities in the Arctic, with forty ice-
breakers (many nuclear powered) and military air and sea bases on the Arc-
tic.258 The other four Arctic coastal states are original members of the NATO 
military alliance and could feasibly counteract any future Russian military ag-
gression in the Arctic.259 In sum, rising military tensions would expose the 
Arctic Council’s express prohibition addressing matters of military security. 
Operating military vessels in the Arctic is uniquely dangerous with its 
harsh conditions and an environment particularly susceptible to degradation in 
the event of an oil spill or similar disaster. The U.S. Coast Guard is currently 
reviewing shipping routes through the Bering Strait with an eye to formalize a 
vessel traffic separation scheme between the United States and Russia.260 In 
the absence of a binding Arctic agreement, the Arctic Eight and other nations 
that routinely operate in the Arctic could adopt a similar “Arctic Incidents at 
Sea Agreement” (“INCSEA”) that could be modeled after the U.S./Soviet 
INCSEA agreement that was signed in 1972 with specific provisions.261 It 
“serves to enhance mutual knowledge and understanding of military activities; 
to reduce the possibility of conflict by accident, miscalculation, or the failure 
of communication; and to increase stability in times of both calm and cri-
sis.”262 The original INCSEA agreement has proven successful in reducing 
risks of collision at sea between U.S. and Russian naval vessels.263 
An Arctic INCSEA would open up a valuable military-to-military dia-
logue and could alleviate rising tensions in the region as military vessels in-
creasingly operate in the Arctic. The U.S. Coast Guard has sought agreement 
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with Russia to establish a traffic separation scheme for the Bering Strait.264 It 
would fall outside the Arctic Council, but it could be signed by the eight Arctic 
nations that commonly operate in the region. 
C. Third Factor: The True Pace of Climate Change and  
“Stationarity” in the Arctic 
The third factor—the pace of climate change and its ultimate impact in 
the Arctic region and the world—will have an immediate effect on the eco-
nomics, health, and infrastructure of the Arctic indigenous peoples.265 Some 
studies have suggested that the flooding and erosion caused by climate change 
will force Arctic villages to retreat and relocate.266 Scientists already assess 
that the earth is warming at twice the overall rate in the polar regions.267 Will 
this pace of change accelerate as ice caps melt? 
Consider one example: climate change’s impact on Greenland and the un-
intended consequences emerging as Greenland’s ice sheet melts. Greenland 
remains one of the most sparsely populated land masses on the earth, but as its 
ice sheet melts valuable minerals can be harvested for the first time in human 
history. Outside investors (many from China) are flooding into Greenland, cre-
ating a division between Greenland—whose population sees this as economic 
opportunity—and its sovereign power, Denmark—which is concerned about 
the environmental impact of the harvesting.268 Indeed, if this independence 
movement keeps its momentum, Greenland may emerge as the first nation 
born from climate change. 
In other contexts, scientists have expressed continual concern about the 
scientific community’s ability to plan for climate change’s impact. For exam-
ple, scientists have historically planned and modeled water resource manage-
ment patterns based upon the concept of “stationarity.” Stationarity is “the idea 
that natural systems fluctuate within an unchanging envelope of variability 
. . . .”269 In part due to the melting of ice sheets and the rapid increase in water 
run-off from ice-free land, scientists have declared “stationarity dead.” Indeed, 
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it no longer serves as a suitable default assumption for water resource man-
agement and planning.270 
The dramatic changes in Arctic ice sheet melting—as well as the rapid de-
terioration of the Antarctic ice sheet—suggest that we are entering uncharted 
territory for planning for the polar regions’ future. Similar to water resource 
management projections, will stationarity be declared dead in the Arctic? Sci-
entists already estimate that the polar regions are twice as vulnerable to climate 
change as other places in the world and the rapidly melting ice caps continue 
to surprise scientists.271 Stationarity, in turn, appears to be on life support in the 
polar regions. The race for the Arctic’s resources and new trade routes will de-
pend, in large part, on the pace of anthropogenic change in the Arctic, an in-
creasingly unknown, wild, and critical variable. 
D. Fourth Factor: Energy Prices, Regulatory  
Permitting and Extraction Costs 
The fourth key factor—the cost of natural resource extraction in the Arc-
tic and oil and natural gas prices—will drive the Arctic economy and most of 
the Arctic’s activity. For now, the primary protection for Arctic waters may be 
the precipitous drop in the price of oil that has made it less economically via-
ble to drill there. In September 2015, Royal Dutch Shell became the latest 
company to suspend Arctic oil exploration after spending more than $7 billion 
over the course of nearly a decade.272 Multiple other major oil companies pre-
viously had stopped Arctic exploration, some announcing that it was too risky 
to drill in such a harsh environment. Although Exxon Mobil found oil in Rus-
sia’s Kara Sea, economic sanctions imposed after Russian incursions in the 
Ukraine forced Exxon to halt its operations there.273 
But, President Trump has re-opened the door for massive Arctic drilling, 
exclaiming that dramatic job growth would result from a recent executive or-
der that overturned President Obama’s offshore Arctic drilling ban.274 Oil pric-
es are a global commodity with rapidly fluctuating prices—when oil prices 
inevitably rise, focus will turn once again to the Arctic and its vast untapped 
resources. Now is an opportune time to consider how to improve environmen-
tal governance in the Arctic, because oil prices remain low. But for how long? 
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E. Fifth Factor: Divergent Interests Between Arctic Coastal States,  
Arctic Non-Coastal States, and Non-Arctic States 
Lastly, the rush for resources in the Arctic is beginning to highlight the 
competing divisions between the three key Arctic actors: (1) Arctic Council 
coastal states; (2) Arctic Council non-coastal states; and (3) non-Arctic states. 
This could potentially undermine the region’s stability. 
Only “[t]he coastal State exercises control over the continental shelf sov-
ereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural re-
sources.”275 The three non-coastal states (Finland, Iceland, and Sweden) that 
are members of the Arctic Council cannot make CLCS submissions. When the 
five Arctic coastal states signed the Ilulissat Declaration in 2008 outside the 
auspices of the Arctic Council, they expressly rejected proposals to negotiate a 
separate Arctic Treaty because UNCLOS was adequate to resolve sovereignty 
conflicts in the Arctic.276 Non-Arctic states such as China, Singapore, and Italy 
are knocking on the Arctic door, seeking a seat at the Arctic Council table as 
the impacts of climate change impact the rest of the world.277 The expanding 
interest from increasingly diverse stakeholders could strain and stress the exist-
ing governance model—will the Arctic Council be up for the challenge? 
CONCLUSION 
For more than half a century the ATS has protected the polar environment 
on the southernmost end of the planet as a scientific reserve. It is unrealistic to 
believe that this approach could be replicated in the Arctic, because several 
countries already exercise sovereignty over most of it. 
Because the Arctic is mostly ocean, UNCLOS provides a strong interna-
tional law building block for environmental governance. In light of the Arctic’s 
increasing importance to trade and the economy, the U.S. Senate should move 
swiftly to ratify UNCLOS. Although the long-term success of the CLCS to 
adjudicate competing claims remains uncertain, it remains the most promising 
venue to do so. And it provides the best hope for peaceful resolution of sover-
eign claims to Arctic waters. The Obama administration’s National Strategy for 
the Arctic Region recognized that “[o]nly by joining [UNCLOS] can we max-
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imize legal certainty and best secure international recognition of our sovereign 
rights with respect to the U.S. extended continental shelf in the Arctic and 
elsewhere.”278 Nevertheless, despite calls from environmentalists, military, and 
scientists to ratify UNCLOS, there is no current plan to do so. 
The Arctic Council’s ability to evolve has been encouraging—whether it 
is up to the task of being the clearinghouse for all Arctic issues remains to be 
seen. The Council should be used to help ensure that any future resource ex-
traction and transportation activities in the Arctic do not cause unreasonable 
damage to the environment. The Arctic nations seem content with the Arctic 
Council process, which has worked well thus far due to continued cooperation 
by Arctic nations.  
As a geopolitical matter, it is unclear what the future holds for the Arctic. 
Previous dire predictions about “armed brinkmanship” in the Arctic have not 
come to fruition.279 Nevertheless, the Arctic will remain a fragile and harsh 
environment with increased maritime traffic and interest from natural resource 
extractors. The Arctic states—through the Arctic Council—should continue to 
build upon the Council’s work and find areas of mutual collaboration in line 
with broader principles of environmental justice and precaution. Negotiation of 
an Arctic Treaty patterned on the ATS may not be realistic, but continued inter-
governmental cooperation certainly is essential. 
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APPENDIX 
Figure 1. The Arctic Region 
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Figure 2. Antarctica 
 
  
 
